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Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules

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Abstract

This paper considers learning rules for environments in which little prior and feedback information is available to the decision-maker. Two properties of such learning rules, absolute expediency and monotonicity, are studied. The paper provides some necessary and some sufficient conditions for these properties. A number of examples show that there is quite a large variety of learning rules which have these properties. It is also shown that all learning rules that have these properties are, in some sense, related to replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory.

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Paper provided by Centro de Estudios Andaluces in its series Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces with number E2001/06.

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Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cea:doctra:e2001_06

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Keywords: Absolute expediency; monotonicity; learning rule; decision making;

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  1. Rustichini, Aldo, 1999. "Optimal Properties of Stimulus--Response Learning Models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 244-273, October.
  2. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  3. David Easley & Aldo Rustichini, 1999. "Choice without Beliefs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1157-1184, September.
  4. T. Borgers & R. Sarin, 2010. "Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 381, David K. Levine.
  5. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  6. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
  7. Cross, John G, 1973. "A Stochastic Learning Model of Economic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 239-66, May.
  8. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November.
  9. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
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Cited by:
  1. Oyarzun, Carlos & Sarin, Rajiv, 2012. "Mean and variance responsive learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 855-866.
  2. Ed Hopkins, 2010. "Adaptive Learning Models of Consumer Behaviour," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000346, David K. Levine.
  3. Antonio J. Morales Siles, 2002. "Absolute Expediency and Imitative Behaviour," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2002/03, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  4. Stefano Ficco & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2004. "Information Overload in Multi-Stage Selection Procedures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 04-077/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Karl H. Schlag, 2007. "Distribution-Free Learning," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute ECO2007/01, European University Institute.
  6. John Huyck & Raymond Battalio & Frederick Rankin, 2007. "Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 53-65, October.
  7. Rivas, Javier, 2013. "Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 148-162.
  8. Carlos Oyarzun & Johannes Ruf, 2009. "Monotone imitation," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 411-441, December.
  9. Carlos Oyarzun & Rajiv Sarin, 2005. "Learning and Risk Aversion," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000482, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Antonio Morales & Pablo Brañas Garza, 2003. "Computational Errors in Guessing Games1," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2003/11, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
  11. Oyarzun, Carlos & Sarin, Rajiv, 2013. "Learning and risk aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 196-225.
  12. Lahkar, Ratul & Seymour, Robert M., 2013. "Reinforcement learning in population games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 10-38.

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