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Reputation versus Social Learning

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  • Jackson, Matthew O.
  • Kalai, Ehud

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 88 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 40-59

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:88:y:1999:i:1:p:40-59

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Nyarko, Yaw, 1994. "Bayesian Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibria in Normal Form Games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 4(6), pages 821-41, October.
  2. Jordan J. S., 1995. "Bayesian Learning in Repeated Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 8-20, April.
  3. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September.
  5. J. Jordan, 2010. "Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 573, David K. Levine.
  6. Jordan, J. S., 1991. "Bayesian learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 60-81, February.
  7. Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. D. Blackwell & L. Dubins, 2010. "Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 565, David K. Levine.
  9. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1998. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 224, David K. Levine.
  10. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  11. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1991. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 981, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Matthew Jackson & Ehud Kalai, 1995. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Discussion Papers 1138, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January.
  14. J. Jordan, 2010. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 475, David K. Levine.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Conlon, John R., 2003. "Hope springs eternal: learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 35-65, September.
  2. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2007. "Social Memory and Evidence from the Past," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1601, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Thierry Vignolo, 2010. "Imitation and selective matching in reputational games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 395-412, June.
  4. Blundell,Richard & Newey,Whitney K. & Persson,Torsten (ed.), 2006. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521692083.
  5. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, 03.
  6. Larry Samuelson, 2003. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000030, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
  8. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.

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