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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 77 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 176-83
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:77:y:1987:i:2:p:176-83

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