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Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players

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  • Drew Fudenberg
  • David K. Levine

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/openclosed.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 221.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1988
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:221

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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References

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  1. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 549-69, May.
  2. Roberts, Kevin, 1980. "The limit points of monopolistic competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 256-278, April.
  3. Green, Edward J., 1980. "Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 155-182, April.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
  5. Green, Edward J, 1984. "Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 975-93, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Hassan Benchekroun & Cees Withagen, 2008. "Nonrenewable Resource Oligopolies And The Cartel-Fringe Game," Departmental Working Papers, McGill University, Department of Economics 2008-02, McGill University, Department of Economics.
  2. Levine, David K., 1991. "Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 148-164, June.
  3. BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & WITHAGEN, Cees, 2010. "On Price Taking Behavior in a Nonrenewable Resource Cartel-Fringe Game," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 11-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  4. Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1114, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Yepes Rodríguez, R., 2005. "Análisis mediante teoría de juegos de la evolución de la competencia en el sector eléctrico español/Game theoretic analysis of the evolution of competition in Spanish power sector," Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Estudios de Economía Aplicada, vol. 23, pages 335-362, Agosto.

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