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Learning and Equilibrium

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  • Levine, David K.
  • Fudenberg, Drew

Abstract

The theory of learning in games studies how, which and what kind of equilibria might arise as a consequence of a long-run non-equilibrium process of learning, adaptation and/or imitation. If agents’ strategies are completely observed at the end of each round, and agents are randomly matched with a series of anonymous opponents, fairly simple rules perform well in terms of the agent’s worst-case payoffs, and also guarantee that any steady state of the system must correspond to an equilibrium. If (as in extensive-form games) players do not observe the strategies chosen by their opponents, then learning is consistent with steady states that are not Nash equilibria because players can maintain incorrect beliefs about off-path play. Beliefs can also be incorrect due to cognitive limitations and systematic inferential errors.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 4382413.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Publication status: Published in Annual Review of Economics
Handle: RePEc:hrv:faseco:4382413

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Cited by:
  1. Dietrichson, Jens & Jochem, Torsten, 2014. "Organizational coordination and costly communication with boundedly rational agents," Comparative Institutional Analysis Working Paper Series, Comparative Institutional Analysis, Lund University School of Economics and Management 2014:1, Comparative Institutional Analysis, Lund University School of Economics and Management.
  2. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00572528 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Clark Bowman & Jonathan Hodge & Ada Yu, 2014. "The potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem in referendum elections," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 111-124, June.
  4. Phillip Johnson & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1998. "Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2138, David K. Levine.
  5. Cui, Zhiwei & Zhai, Jian, 2010. "Escape dynamics and equilibria selection by iterative cycle decomposition," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1015-1029, November.
  6. Topi Miettinen, 2012. "Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 193-222, May.
  7. Dietrichson, Jens, 2013. "Coordination Incentives, Performance Measurement and Resource Allocation in Public Sector Organizations," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2013:26, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  8. Christoph March, 2011. "Adaptive social learning," PSE Working Papers halshs-00572528, HAL.

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