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Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities

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Author Info
Drew Fudenberg
David K. Levine
Jean Tirole

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Abstract

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 229.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1987
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:229

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Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers," Working papers 366, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bulow, Jeremy I, 1982. "Durable-Goods Monopolists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 314-32, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
  5. Ken Binmore & Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1986. "The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 176-188, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo & Wilson, Robert, 1986. "Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 155-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Riley, John & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1983. "Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 267-89, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paul Schweinzer, 2006. "Sequential bargaining with pure common values," Discussion Papers 137, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2006. "Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 762, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gilles Chemla & Antoine Faure Grimaud, 1996. "Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt," Economics Working Papers 196, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Roman Inderst, 2008. "Dynamic Bilateral Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential Buyers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 220-236, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Randolph Sloof, 2003. "Price-setting Power versus Private Information," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-099/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  6. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
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