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Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players

In: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games

Author

Listed:
  • DREW FUDENBERG

    (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, USA)

  • DAVID K. LEVINE

    (Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, California, 90024, USA)

Abstract

If players are small, one might expect that optimal reactions to one-player deviations are negligible, so that the open- and closed-loop equilibria are approximately the same. We investigate the circumstances in which this is true.

Suggested Citation

  • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 3, pages 41-58, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789812818478_0003
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    Cited by:

    1. Fouad Ouardighi & Matan Shnaiderman & Federico Pasin, 2014. "Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 161(2), pages 626-647, May.
    2. Mathevet, Laurent & Steiner, Jakub, 2013. "Tractable dynamic global games and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2583-2619.
    3. Ag�nor, Pierre-Richard & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Kharroubi, Enisse & Lombardo, Giovanni & Pereira da Silva, Luiz A., 2017. "The International Dimensions of Macroprudential Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 12108, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Laurent Mathevet & Jakub Steiner, 2012. "Sand in the Wheels: A Dynamic Global-Game Approach," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp459, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    5. Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-374.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 6, pages 95-120, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Jaakkola, Niko & van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2019. "Non-cooperative and cooperative climate policies with anticipated breakthrough technology," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 42-66.
    8. Maurizio Iacopetta, 2014. "Dynamics of assets liquidity and inequality in economies with decentralized markets," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2029nqlehl8, Sciences Po.
    9. Maurizion Iacopetta, 2016. "Commercial revolutions, search, and development," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2016-08, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    10. Fouad El Ouardighi & Konstantin Kogan & Giorgio Gnecco & Marcello Sanguineti, 2020. "Transboundary pollution control and environmental absorption efficiency management," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 653-681, April.
    11. Jian Yang, 2021. "Analysis of Markovian Competitive Situations Using Nonatomic Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 184-216, March.
    12. Daniel Bjorkegren, 2020. "Competition in Network Industries: Evidence from the Rwandan Mobile Phone Network," Working Papers 2020-04, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    13. Yepes Rodríguez, R., 2005. "Análisis mediante teoría de juegos de la evolución de la competencia en el sector eléctrico español/Game theoretic analysis of the evolution of competition in Spanish power sector," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 23, pages 335-362, Agosto.
    14. Oladi, Reza & Caplan, Arthur J. & Gilbert, John, 2018. "Sequestration and the engagement of developing economies in a global carbon market," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 50-63.
    15. Maurizio Iacopetta, 2016. "Commercial Revolutions, Search, and Development," 2016 Meeting Papers 1394, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Romeo Balanquit, 2013. "Stable Commitment in an Intertemporal Collusive Trade," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201301, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
    17. Iacopetta, Maurizio, 2019. "The Emergence Of Money: A Dynamic Analysis," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(7), pages 2573-2596, October.
    18. Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-374.
    19. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, 2014. "Open and Closed Loop Nash Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 280-301, January.
    20. Marian Leimbach & Anselm Schultes & Lavinia Baumstark & Anastasis Giannousakis & Gunnar Luderer, 2017. "Solution algorithms for regional interactions in large-scale integrated assessment models of climate change," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 255(1), pages 29-45, August.
    21. Francisco Silva & Samir Mamadehussene, 2020. "The Equivalence Between Sequential and Simultaneous Firm Decisions," Documentos de Trabajo 541, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Long-Run Players; Limit Games; Robustness; Equilibrium; Reputation Effects; Repeated Games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General

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