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Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship

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Listed:
  • Drew Fudenberg
  • Luis Rayo

Abstract

A principal specifies time paths of effort provision, task allocation, and knowledge transfer for a cash-constrained apprentice, who is free to walk away at any time. In the optimal contract the apprentice pays for training by working for low or no wages and by working inefficiently hard. The apprentice can work on both knowledge-complementary and knowledge-independent tasks. We study the optimal time path of effort distortions and their impact on the knowledge transfer, and analyze the effect of regulatory limits on the length of apprenticeships and on how much effort apprentices are allowed to provide.

Suggested Citation

  • Drew Fudenberg & Luis Rayo, 2019. "Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(11), pages 3780-3812, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:109:y:2019:i:11:p:3780-3812
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171939
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Georgiadis, George & Rayo, Luis, 2021. "Working to learn," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    2. Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 653-669.
    3. Santiago Caicedo & Miguel Espinosa & Arthur Seibold, 2022. "Unwilling to Train?—Firm Responses to the Colombian Apprenticeship Regulation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(2), pages 507-550, March.
    4. Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 0. "Contracting over persistent information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    5. Jason J Sandvik & Richard E Saouma & Nathan T Seegert & Christopher T Stanton, 2020. "Workplace Knowledge Flows," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(3), pages 1635-1680.
    6. Radoslawa Nikolowa & Daniel Ferreira, 2018. "How to Sell Jobs," Working Papers 846, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    7. Marino, Anthony M., 2021. "Productivity investment with hidden action," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 154-163.
    8. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2023. "Task allocation and on-the-job training," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    9. Grabiszewski, Konrad & Horenstein, Alex, 2020. "Effort is not a monotonic function of skills: Results from a global mobile experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 634-652.
    10. Ian Ball, 2023. "Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1363-1391, July.
    11. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F. Garrett, 2023. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(3), pages 1025-1075, May.
    12. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2024. "Prestige, promotion, and pay," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118369, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    13. Santiago Caicedo & Arthur Seibold & Miguel Espinosa, 2019. "The Effects of Mandating Training in Firms: Theory and Evidence from the Colombian Apprenticeship Program," 2019 Meeting Papers 888, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Orlov, Dmitry, 2022. "Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    15. Zeinab Aboutalebi & Ayush Pant, 2021. "Believe ... and you are there. On Self-Confidence and Feedback," Working Papers 64, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    16. Zuomiao Xie & Shiqi Yuan & Jinjing Zhu & Alistair Palferman, 2023. "Dynamic value sharing based on employee contribution as a competitiveness-enhancing device," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Training

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