Do Dominant Firms Provide More Training?
AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between firm-specific training and product market competition. A canonical Cournot competition model shows that the profitability of training investments increases as the number of competitors decreases. Empirical evidence from British establishments in 1998, 2004 and 2011 confirms that a critical form of specific training, cross-training, is far more extensive in less competitive product markets. This persists within all three separate cross-sections and in two separate panel estimates and suggests that a dominant product market position increases the incentives to invest in specific human capital.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Cyprus Department of Economics in its series University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics with number 06-2014.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: May 2014
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.ucy.ac.cy
Specific training; Cross-training; Product market competition; Panel data;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-05-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2014-05-24 (Business Economics)
- NEP-TID-2014-05-24 (Technology & Industrial Dynamics)
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