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Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future

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  • Ian Ball

Abstract

I study the optimal provision of information in a long‐term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses public actions that affect the welfare of both players. I solve for the sender's optimal policy in closed form: the sender reports the value of the state with a delay that shrinks over time and eventually vanishes. Even when the receiver knows the current state, the sender retains leverage by threatening to conceal the future evolution of the state.

Suggested Citation

  • Ian Ball, 2023. "Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(4), pages 1363-1391, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:91:y:2023:i:4:p:1363-1391
    DOI: 10.3982/ECTA17345
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    References listed on IDEAS

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