Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 242.
Date of creation: 01 May 1982
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
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- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 227-250, December.
- Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
- David Levine, 1982. "Enforcement of Collusion in Oligopoly," UCLA Economics Working Papers 247, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Peter Cramton, 1984.
"Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
84res, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Cramton, Peter C, 1984. "Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(4), pages 579-93, October.
- Susan Woodward, 1982. "Strike Activity and Wage Settlements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 249, UCLA Department of Economics.
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