1. Levine, David K & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1995. "When Are Agents Negligible?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1160-70, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "When Are Agents Negligible?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 96, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Wolfgang Pesendorfer & David Levine, 1992. "When are Agents Negligible?," Discussion Papers 1018, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
2. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
3. Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1985. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games -- II," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 247-262, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1984. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 111-139, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1988. "Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 221, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
5. Celentani, Marco & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "Reputation in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 109-132, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Marco Celentani & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1992. "Reputation in Dynamic Games," Discussion Papers 1009, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
6. Green, Edward J., 1980. "Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 155-182, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
8. Sabourian, Hamid, 1990. "Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 92-110, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
10. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1988. "Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-18, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Rann Smorodinsky, 1998. "Large Non-Anonymous Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 1250, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
2. Weintraub, Gabriel Y. & Benkard, C. Lanier & Van Roy, Benjamin, 2007. "Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms," Research Papers 1919r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
3. Marco Bassetto, 2000. "A Game-Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1492, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Marco Bassetto, 2001. "A game-theoretic view of the fiscal theory of the price level," Working Papers 612, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
   • Marco Bassetto, 2002. "A Game-Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2167-2195, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Gabriele Camera & Marco Casari, 2007. "Cooperation among strangers: an experiment with indefinite interaction," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1201, Purdue University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Marco Bassetto & Christopher Phelan, 2006. "Tax riots," Working Paper Series WP-06-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Christopher Phelan & Marco Bassetto, 2004. "Tax Riots," 2004 Meeting Papers 375, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   • Christopher Phelan & Marco Bassetto, 2005. "Tax Riots," 2005 Meeting Papers 433, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
   • Marco Bassetto & Christopher Phelan, 2008. "Tax Riots," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 75(3), pages 649-669, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)