Large Non-Anonymous Repeated Games
AbstractSaborian , following Green , studies a class of repeated games where a player's payoff depends on his stage action and an anonymous aggregate outcome, and shows that long-run players behave myopically in any equilibrium of such games. In this paper we extend Sabourian's results to games where the aggregate outcome is not necessarily an anonymous function of players' actions, and where players strategies may depend non-anonymously on signals of other players' behavior. Our argument also provides a conceptually simpler proof of Green and Sabourian's analysis, showing how their basic result is driven by bounds on how many pivotal players there can be in a game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1250.
Date of creation: Dec 1998
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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- Sabourian, Hamid, 1990. "Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 92-110, June.
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1998.
"When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?,"
3203775, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?," Discussion Papers 1114, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible," Levine's Working Paper Archive 180, David K. Levine.
- Green, Edward J., 1980. "Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 155-182, April.
- Mailath, George J & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 351-67, July.
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