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Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets

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Author Info
Green, Edward J.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 22 (1980)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 155-182
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:22:y:1980:i:2:p:155-182

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible," Levine's Working Paper Archive 180, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1988. "Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 221, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  3. Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," Game Theory and Information 0311004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Jovanovic, Boyan & MacDonald, Glenn M., 1988. "Competitive Diffusion," Working Papers 88-29, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
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  5. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans," Staff Report 122, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Philip R. P. Coelho & James E. McClure, 2007. "The Market for Lemmas," Working Papers 200702, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
  7. V.V. Chari, 1988. "Time consistency and optimal policy design," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 17-31. [Downloadable!]
  8. Lorenzo Rocco, 2007. "Anonymity in nonatomic games," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 225-247, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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