Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Strategic behavior in non-atomic games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Barlo, Mehmet
  • Carmona, Guilherme

Abstract

In order to remedy the possible loss of strategic interaction in non-atomic games with a societal choice, this study proposes a refinement of Nash equilibrium, strategic equilibrium. Given a non-atomic game, its perturbed game is one in which every player believes that he alone has a small, but positive, impact on the societal choice; and a distribution is a strategic equilibrium if it is a limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibrium distributions of games in which each player's belief about his impact on the societal choice goes to zero. After proving the existence of strategic equilibria, we show that all of them must be Nash. Moreover, it is displayed that in many economic applications, the set of strategic equilibria coincides with that of Nash equilibria of large finite games.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35549/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 35549.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 13 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35549

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Strategic equilibrium; Games with a continuum of players; Equilibrium distributions;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
  2. David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995. "When Are Agents Negligible?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 96, David K. Levine.
  3. Damme, E.E.C. van & Kühn, H. & Harsanyi, J. & Selten, R. & Weibull, J. & Nash Jr., J. & Hammerstein, P., 1996. "The work of John Nash in game theory," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73413, Tilburg University.
  4. Khan, M. Ali & Rath, Kali P. & Sun, Yeneng, 1997. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 13-46, September.
  5. V. V. Chari & Patrick J Kehoe, 1998. "Sustainable Plans," Levine's Working Paper Archive 600, David K. Levine.
  6. V. V. Chari & Patrick E. Kehoe, 1990. "Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default," IMF Working Papers 90/22, International Monetary Fund.
  7. V.V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Sustainable plans and debt," Staff Report 125, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  8. Guilherme Carmona, 2009. "A remark on the measurability of large games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 491-494, June.
  9. Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games," Game Theory and Information 0412008, EconWPA.
  10. Sabourian, Hamid, 1990. "Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 92-110, June.
  11. Carmona, Guilherme, 2008. "Large games with countable characteristics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3-4), pages 344-347, February.
  12. Podczeck, Konrad, 2008. "On the convexity and compactness of the integral of a Banach space valued correspondence," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 836-852, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp466, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  2. Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," Game Theory and Information 0311004, EconWPA.
  3. Carmona, Guilherme, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of the Concept of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp425, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  4. Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "A Re-Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium Based on the Notion of Social Institutions," Game Theory and Information 0311005, EconWPA.
  5. Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "On the Existence of Equilibrium Bank Runs in a Diamond-Dybvig Environment," Finance 0404009, EconWPA.
  6. Alioğulları, Zeynel Harun & Barlo, Mehmet, 2012. "Entropic selection of Nash equilibrium," MPRA Paper 37132, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35549. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.