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Walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria. Part II: Pure strategies

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Novshek, William
Sonnenschein, Hugo

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 30 (1983)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 171-187
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:30:y:1983:i:1:p:171-187

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "Nash and Limit Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," Game Theory and Information 0311004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Guilherme Carmona, 2004. "Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players," Game Theory and Information 0412009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2007. "Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms," MPRA Paper 3353, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Larry E. Jones, 1983. "The Efficiency of Monopolistically Competitive Equilibria in Large Economies: Commodity Differentiation With Pure Substitutes," Discussion Papers 574, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  5. Weintraub, Gabriel Y. & Benkard, C. Lanier & Van Roy, Benjamin, 2007. "Markov Perfect Industry Dynamics with Many Firms," Research Papers 1919r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
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