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Nash Equilibria of Games with a Continuum of Players

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  • Carmona, Guilherme

Abstract

We characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players (Mas-Colell (1984)) in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. For the concept of ("; ")  equilibrium  in which the fraction of players not "  optimizing is less than "  we show that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium in a game with a continuum of players if and only if there exists a sequence of finite games such that its restriction is an ("n; "n)  equilibria, with "n converging to zero. The same holds for "  equilibrium  in which almost all players are "  optimizing  provided that either players payoff functions are equicontinuous or players action space is finite. Furthermore, we give conditions under which the above results hold for all approximating sequences of games. In our characterizations, a sequence of finite games approaches the continuum game in the sense that the number of players converges to infinity and the distribution of characteristics and actions in the finite games converges to that of the continuum game. These results render approximate equilibria of large finite economies as an alternative way of obtaining strategic insignificance.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia in its series FEUNL Working Paper Series with number wp466.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp466

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  1. Carmona, Guilherme, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games," FEUNL Working Paper Series, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia wp465, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  2. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1983. "Walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria. Part I: Mixed strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 153-170, June.
  3. Novshek, William & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1983. "Walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria. Part II: Pure strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 171-187, June.
  4. Guilherme Carmona, 2003. "Symmetric Approximate Equilibrium Distributions with Finite Support," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0311006, EconWPA.
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Scholarly Articles 3350443, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  6. Green, Edward J, 1984. "Continuum and Finite-Player Noncooperative Models of Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 975-93, July.
  7. M Ali Khan & Kali P Rath & Yeneng Sun, 1994. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players," Economics Working Paper Archive, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics 381, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Feb 1997.
  8. Hildenbrand, W & Mertens, J F, 1972. "Upper Hemi-Continuity of the Equilibrium-Set Correspondence for Pure Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 40(1), pages 99-108, January.
  9. Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme, 2011. "Strategic behavior in non-atomic games," MPRA Paper 35549, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Rashid, Salim, 1983. "Equilibrium points of non-atomic games : Asymptotic results," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 7-10.
  11. Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April.
  12. Wooders, M. & Selten, R. & Cartwright, E., 2001. "Some First Results for Noncooperative Pregames : Social Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics 589, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Yang, Jian, 2011. "Asymptotic interpretations for equilibria of nonatomic games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 491-499.
  2. Carmona, Guilherme, 2006. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games," FEUNL Working Paper Series, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia wp487, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  3. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron, 2013. "Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2436-2466.
  4. Carmona, Guilherme & Podczeckz, Konrad, 2008. "On the Existence of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Large Games," FEUNL Working Paper Series, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia wp531, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  5. Guilherme Carmona, 2009. "Intermediate Preferences and Behavioral Conformity in Large Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(1), pages 9-25, 02.

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