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Reputation with Observed Actions

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Author Info

  • Celentani, Marco

Abstract

A single long-run player plays a fixed-stage game (simultaneous or sequential move) against an infinite sequence of short-run opponents that play only once but can observe all past realized actions. Assuming that the probability distributions over types of long- and short-run players have full support, we show that the long-run player can always establish a reputation for the Stackelberg strategy and is therefore guaranteed almost his Stackelberg payoff in all Nash equilibria of the repeated game.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 407-19

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:407-19

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Cited by:
  1. Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.
  2. Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?," Discussion Papers 1114, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.

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