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Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1

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  • Dubey, Pradeep
  • Kaneko, Mamoru

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  • Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1984. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 111-139, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:8:y:1984:i:2:p:111-139
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    Cited by:

    1. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
    2. Gaël Giraud & Myrna Wooders, 2012. "On the Simultaneous Emergence of Money and the State," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12094, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    3. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 124, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. Burkhard Schipper & Martin Meier & Aviad Heifetz, 2011. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games," Working Papers 287, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Burkhard Schipper, 2017. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 176, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 6, pages 95-120, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Ehud Kalai, 2006. "Structural Robustness of Large Games," Discussion Papers 1431, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori, 2003. "Optimal scrutiny in multi-period promotion tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-24, January.
    9. Burkhard Schipper, 2017. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 204, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    10. Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Social learning in nonatomic routing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 221-233.
    11. Peter J. Hammond, 2017. "Designing a strategyproof spot market mechanism with many traders: twenty-two steps to Walrasian equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(1), pages 1-50, January.
    12. Schipper, Burkhard C. & Woo, Hee Yeul, 2019. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(1), pages 41-88, January.
    13. J. Jude Kline & Shravan Luckraz, 2016. "Equivalence between graph-based and sequence-based extensive form games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 85-94, April.
    14. Alessandro Marchesiani, 2022. "The Essentiality of Money in a Trading Post Economy with Random Matching," Working Papers 202223, University of Liverpool, Department of Economics.
    15. Pradeep Dubey & Siddhartha Sahi, 2016. "Optimal Transfers in Noncooperative Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 16-04, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    16. Lorenzo Rocco, 2007. "Anonymity in nonatomic games," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 54(2), pages 225-247, June.
    17. Kaneko, Mamoru & Kline, J. Jude, 2008. "Inductive game theory: A basic scenario," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(12), pages 1332-1363, December.
    18. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
    19. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2014. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Working Papers 148, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    20. Giraud, Gael & Stahn, Hubert, 2003. "Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 559-583, July.
    21. Giraud, Gael, 2003. "Strategic market games: an introduction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 355-375, July.
    22. Gaël GIRAUD & Sonia WEYERS, 2003. "Strategic Market Games with a Finite Horizon and Incomplete," Working Papers of BETA 2003-04, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    23. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2012. "Political Awareness and Microtargeting of Voters in Electoral Competition," Working Papers 46, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

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