Random matching in adaptive dynamics
AbstractThis paper studies the effect of randomness in per-period matching on the long-run outcome of non-equilibrium adaptive processes. If there are many matchings between each strategy revision, the randomness due to matching will be small; our question is when a very small noise due to matching has a negligible effect. We study two different senses of this idea, and provide sufficient conditions for each. The less demanding sense corresponds to sending the matching noise to zero while holding fixed all other aspects of the adaptive process. The second sense in which matching noise can be negligible is that it does not alter the limit distribution obtained as the limit of the invariant distributions as an exogenous "mutation rate" goes to zero.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 66 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Equilibrium selection Imitation process Repeated matching Stochastic matching process Invariant distribution Limit distribution Markov chain;
Other versions of this item:
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof, 2007. "Random matching in adaptive dynamics," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000815, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Imhof, Lorens & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2009. "Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics," Scholarly Articles 3190371, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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