Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 51 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin., 1987. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8736, University of California at Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains," Working papers 499, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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- Thomas, J. P., 1995. "Subgame-perfect attainment of minimax punishments in discounted two-person games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-4, January.
- Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992.
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- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004.
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- Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Scholarly Articles 3196336, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2004. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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