Valuating payoff streams under unequal discount factors
AbstractWe study repeated prize allocation when the discount factors of the agents are unequal. The feasible set of payoffs behaves badly: the Pareto frontier is everywhere discontinuous and there is an open subset of (high) discount factors under which the feasible set is totally disconnected.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 99 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Valuating Payoff Streams under Unequal Discount Factors," Discussion Papers 16, Aboa Centre for Economics.
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987.
"On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games,"
467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991. "On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
- Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E., 1990.
"Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 194-206, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains," Working papers 499, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin., 1987. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8736, University of California at Berkeley.
- Ehud Lehrer & Ady Pauzner, 1999. "Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 393-412, March.
- Yuichi Yamamoto, 2010. "The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 431-443, July.
- Kimmo Berg & Mitri Kitti, 2013. "Computing Equilibria in Discounted 2 × 2 Supergames," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 41(1), pages 71-88, January.
- Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 571-581.
- Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige, 2013. "On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 295-303, February.
- Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2011. "Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 507-516.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.