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Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games

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Author Info
D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number 8736.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 1987
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Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbwp:8736

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Ehud Kalai & Alejandro Neme, 1989. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," Discussion Papers 858, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jeffery Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003. "Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoloy with Entry and Exit," Discussion Papers 1381, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jimmy Chan, 2000. "On the Non-Existence of Reputation Effects in Two-Person Infinitely-Repeated Games," Economics Working Paper Archive 441, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

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