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Négociation collective et théorie des jeux : le rôle du temps dans la littérature récente

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  • Wagneur, Edouard

    (Groupe d'études et de recherche en analyse des décisions (GERAD), École des Hautes Études Commerciales de Montréal)

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  • Wagneur, Edouard, 1988. "Négociation collective et théorie des jeux : le rôle du temps dans la littérature récente," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 64(1), pages 68-95, mars.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:64:y:1988:i:1:p:68-95
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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
    3. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
    5. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    6. Joel Sobel & Takahashi, 1983. "A Multi-stage Model of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 255, David K. Levine.
    7. Kurz, Mordecai, 1978. "Altruism as an Outcome of Social Interaction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 216-222, May.
    8. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
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