Contagion and State Dependent Mutations

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Contagion and State Dependent Mutations

Author Info

Lee, I H
Szeidl, A
Valentinyi, A

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected on the long run by the best response dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualified this result by showing that for a given population size the evolutionary process can select any strict Nash equilibrium if the probability of choosing a nonbest reply is state-dependent. This paper shows that the unique selection of the risk dominant equilibrium is robust with respect to state dependent mutation in local interaction games. More precisely, for a given mutation structure there exists a minimum population size beyond which the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected. Our result is driven by contagion and cohesion among players, which exists only in local interaction settings and favors the play of the risk dominant strategy. Our result strengthens the equilibrium selection result of evolutionary game theory.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 0027.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:stn:sotoec:0027

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ
Phone: (+44) 23 80592537
Fax: (+44) 23 80593858
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.soton.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Chris Thorn).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Article
- In Ho Lee & Adam Szeidl & Akos Valentinyi, 2003. "Contagion and State Dependent Mutations," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1063-1063. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Adam Szeidl & In Ho Lee & Akos Valentinyi, 2001. "Contagion and State Dependent Mutations," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0104, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Jeffrey C. Ely, 2002. "Local Conventions," Discussion Papers 1349, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jeffrey Ely, 2002. "Local Conventions," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1044-1044. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lee, In Ho & Valentinyi, Akos, 2000. "Noisy Contagion without Mutation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(1), pages 47-56, January.
Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- BERGINÊ, James & LIPMAN, Bart, 1994. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," CORE Discussion Papers 1994055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
Ellison, Glenn, 1993. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1047-71, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Anderlini, Luca & Ianni, Antonella, 1996. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-177, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Aderlini, L. & Ianni, A., 1993. "Path Dependence and Learning from Neighbours," Papers 186, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
Blume Lawrence E., 1995. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 111-145, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Lawrence Blume, 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision," Game Theory and Information 9307001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jan 1994. [Downloadable!]
Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Sanjeev Goyal, 2003. "Learning in Networks: a survey," Economics Discussion Papers 563, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Thomas Norman, . "Step-by-Step Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Economics Papers 2003-W08, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc encourages publishers to make their bibliographic data freely available to the public.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-3.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.