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PD Games on Networks

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  • Allen wilhite
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    Abstract

    We tend to interact with same people, day after day. Might this affect our behavior? In an abstract fashion, we look at this question. To model this repeated interaction with a small subset of the entire population we place agents on the nodes of a network and have them play a prisoners’ dilemma game exclusively with their neighbors. We then alter the payoffs of the game and the topology of the network to see if, when, and to what degree cooperation survives. We find widely divergent aggregate decisions across networks and across payoffs. But, there is commonality as well. It seems clear that some networks, or some organizational structures, are more conducive to fostering cooperation

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    File URL: http://cas.uah.edu/wilhitea/papers/pdgames.pdf
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    File URL: http://repec.org/sce2005/up.21006.1103564743.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 with number 20.

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    Date of creation: 11 Nov 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf5:20

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    Keywords: PD games; networks;

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    1. H Peyton Young, 2000. "The Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks," Economics Working Paper Archive 437, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    2. G. Ellison & D. Fudenberg, 2010. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 435, David K. Levine.
    3. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    4. repec:att:wimass:9612 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Morris, Stephen, 2000. "Contagion," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 57-78, January.
    6. Eshel, Ilan & Samuelson, Larry & Shaked, Avner, 1998. "Altruists, Egoists, and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 157-79, March.
    7. Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996. "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers 9612r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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