PD Games on Networks
AbstractWe tend to interact with same people, day after day. Might this affect our behavior? In an abstract fashion, we look at this question. To model this repeated interaction with a small subset of the entire population we place agents on the nodes of a network and have them play a prisonersâ€™ dilemma game exclusively with their neighbors. We then alter the payoffs of the game and the topology of the network to see if, when, and to what degree cooperation survives. We find widely divergent aggregate decisions across networks and across payoffs. But, there is commonality as well. It seems clear that some networks, or some organizational structures, are more conducive to fostering cooperation
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 with number 20.
Date of creation: 11 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
PD games; networks;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2005-11-19 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2005-11-19 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2005-11-19 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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