We consider processes in which new technologies and forms of behavior are transmitted through social and geographic networks Agents adopt behaviors based on a combination of their inherent payoff and their local popularity (the number of neighbors who have adopted them) subject to some random error We characterize the long-run dynamics of such processes in terms of the geometry of the network but without placing a priori restrictions on the network structure When agents interact in sufficiently small close-knit groups the expected waiting time until almost everyone is playing the stochastically stable equilibrium is bounded above independently of the number of agents and independently of the initial state
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Paper provided by The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Paper Archive with number
437.
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Jackson, Matthew O. & Yariv, Leeat, .
"Diffusion on social networks,"
Working Papers
1251, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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