The Emergence of Local Norms in Networks
AbstractWe develop an explanation of the emergence of local norms, and the associated phenom- enon of geographical variation in behavior. Individuals are assumed to interact locally with neighbors in an environment with a network externality. Although many patterns of behavior are possible, the dispersed interactive choices of agents are shown to select behavior that is locally uniform but globally diverse. The range of applications of the theory includes regional variation in the practice of medicine, technology choice, and corruption. The framework is also useful for further developing our understanding of important phenomena like lock-in, critical thresholds, and contagion
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 with number 299.
Date of creation: 11 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Social norms; networks; geographical variation;
Other versions of this item:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2005-11-19 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2005-11-19 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-NET-2005-11-19 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2005-11-19 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2005-11-19 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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