The Emergence of Local Norms in Networks
AbstractWe develop an explanation of the emergence of local norms, and theassociated phenomenon of geographical variation in behavior.Individuals are assumed to interact locally with neighbors in anenvironment with a network externality. Although many patterns ofbehavior are possible, the dispersed interactive choices of agentsare shown to select behavior that is locally uniform but globallydiverse. The range of applications of the theory includes regionalvariation in the practice of medicine, technology choice, andcorruption. The framework is also useful for further developing ourunderstanding of important phenomena like lock-in, criticalthresholds, and contagion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Florida State University in its series Working Papers with number wp2006_02_01.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Publication status: Forthcoming in Complexity journal
Note: This paper has been accepted in Complexity journal (http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/38804) and is not available on-line from RePEc.
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- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
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