The Emergence of Local Norms in Networks
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More about this item
KeywordsSocial norms; networks; geographical variation;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2005-11-19 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2005-11-19 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-NET-2005-11-19 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2005-11-19 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2005-11-19 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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