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Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

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  • Azrieli, Yaron

Abstract

We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player i is a best response to the distribution of strategies of his opponents (when they face i) in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 303-310

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:3:p:303-310

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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Keywords: Random-matching Categorization Correlated equilibrium;

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  1. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
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  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine.
  4. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
  5. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  6. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, . "Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions," Penn CARESS Working Papers, Penn Economics Department 65b8832286a695ab9adcaad9f, Penn Economics Department.
  7. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2004. "Categorization generated by prototypes -- an axiomatic approach," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0405003, EconWPA.
  8. Philippe Jehiel & Frederic Koessler, 2005. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise 2005-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  9. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  10. Robert J. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000377, David K. Levine.
  11. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  12. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, . ""Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search''," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences 98-06, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  13. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
  14. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
  1. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  2. Vessela Daskalova & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2014. "Categorization and Coordination," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 719, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.

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