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Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection

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  • Kreindler, Gabriel E.
  • Young, H. Peyton
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    Abstract

    Stochastic best response models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the noise level is arbitrarily small. The difficulty is that, when the noise is extremely small, it can take an extremely long time for a large population to reach the stochastically stable equilibrium. An important exception arises when players interact locally in small close-knit groups; in this case convergence can be rapid for small noise and an arbitrarily large population. We show that a similar result holds when the population is fully mixed and there is no local interaction. Moreover, the expected waiting times are comparable to those in local interaction models.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825613000262
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 80 (2013)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 39-67

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:39-67

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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    References

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    Cited by:
    1. Sandholm, William H. & Tercieux, Olivier & Oyama, Daisuke, 0. "Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    2. Kevin Hasker, 2014. "The Emergent Seed: A Representation Theorem for Models of Stochastic Evolution and two formulas for Waiting Time," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000954, David K. Levine.

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