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Rule Rationality

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  • Heller, Yuval
  • Winter, Eyal

Abstract

We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first).

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48746.

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Date of creation: 31 Jul 2013
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48746

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Keywords: Bounded Rationality; Commitments; Categorization; Value of information.;

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