Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example
AbstractMyerson's (1984) extension of the lambda-transfer value to cooperative games with incomplete information focus among other things on the strength of the incentive constraints at the solution for determining the power of coalitions. We construct an intuitive three-player game where the player whose only contribution is to partly release the two other players from the incentive constraints they face when they cooperate, receives a zero payoff, according to Myerson's solution. On the contrary, the random order arrival procedure attributes a strictly positive payoff to him. Our example is thus an analog of the banker game of Owen (1972) that was designed for evaluating the lambda-transfer value under complete information. Asymmetric information now takes up the role that was formerly attributed to the lack of transferability of utilities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2002014.
Date of creation: 00 Mar 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2005. "Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-82, October.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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