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The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information

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Author Info
Krasa, Stefan
Yannelis, Nicholas C
Abstract

The authors analyze the Shapley value allocation of an economy with differential information. They address the following questions: How do coalitions of agents share their private information? How can one measure the information advantage or superiority of an agent? Is each agent's private information verifiable by other members of a coalition? Do coalitions of agents pool their private information? Do agents have an incentive to report their true private information? Do value allocations exist in an economy with differential information? The authors provide answers to each of these questions. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 62 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 881-900
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:62:y:1994:i:4:p:881-900

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  1. Ulrich Schwalbe, 1999. "The core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(2), pages 155-185, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Glycopantis, Dionysius & Muir, Allan & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2004. "Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium," Economics Series 148, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Beth Allen, 1996. "Cooperative theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 225, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  4. Martins-da-Rocha, V. F. & Angeloni, Laura, 2008. "Large economies with differential information but without free disposal," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 671, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  5. Beth Allen, 1996. "Implementation theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 226, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  6. Laura Angeloni & V. Martins-da-Rocha, 2009. "Large economies with differential information and without free disposal," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 263-286, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Dionysius Glycopantis & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Konrad Podczeck, 2009. "Symposium on: equilibria with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 217-219, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Angeloni, Laura & Martins-da-Rocha, V. F., 2007. "Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 647, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
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