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Values for Cooperative Games over Graphs and Games With Inadmissible Coalitions

Author

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  • Ziv Hellman

    (Bar-Ilan University)

  • Ron Peretz

Abstract

We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting ‘graph value’ (and ‘S-value’ in the general case) is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.

Suggested Citation

  • Ziv Hellman & Ron Peretz, 2015. "Values for Cooperative Games over Graphs and Games With Inadmissible Coalitions," Working Papers 2015-04, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2015-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shapley value; network games.;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D46 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Value Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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