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Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing

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Author Info
Martin Shubik () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

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Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 112.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1961
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Publication status: Published in Management Science (April 1962), 8(3): 325-343
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:112

Note: CFP 178.
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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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  1. Koster, M., 2005. "Sharing Variable Returns of Cooperation," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-06, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  2. Koster, M., 1998. "Multi-service serial cost sharing : a characterization of the Moulin-Shenker rule," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing," Working Papers 2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. SPRUMONT, Yves & MOULIN, Hervé, 2005. "Fair Allocation of Production Externalities: Recent Results," Cahiers de recherche 2005-22, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lone Grønbæk, 2000. "Fishery Economics and Game Theory," Working Papers 14/00, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2003. "On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing," Working Papers 2003-10, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. SPRUMONT, Yves, 2004. "Nearly Serial Sharing Methods," Cahiers de recherche 2004-14, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  8. Eric Friedman, 1997. "Paths in Additive Cost Sharing," Departmental Working Papers 199706, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Sprumont, Yves, 2004. "Aumann-Shapley Pricing: A Reconsideration of the Discrete Case," Cahiers de recherche 11-2004, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ. [Downloadable!]
  10. Koster, M., 1998. "Multi-service serial cost sharing : an incompatibility with smoothness," Discussion Paper 122, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Gabrielle Demange, 2001. "On stability and incentives in hierarchies," DELTA Working Papers 2001-09, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  12. Byungwan Koh & Jungsuk Oh, 2006. "Determination of Revenue Streams Subject to Sharing in the Mobile Internet Market," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 5(3), pages 337-350, September. [Downloadable!]
  13. Brink, Rene van den & Gilles, Robert P., 2005. "Explicit and latent authority in hierarchical organizations," Discussion Paper 75, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Eric Friedman, 1997. "Weak and Strong Consistency in Additive Cost Sharing," Departmental Working Papers 199707, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Kattuman, P.A. & Green, R.J. & Bialek, J.W., 2001. "A Tracing Method for Pricing Inter-Area Electricity Trades," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0107, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
  16. Avraham Beja & Israel Zang, 1986. "Internal Pricing and Cost Allocation for Efficient Decentralized Control," Discussion Papers 703, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  17. Yves Sprumont, 2008. "Nearly serial sharing methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 155-184, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Koster, M., 2005. "Cost Sharing, Differential Games, and the Moulin-Shenker Rule," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-07, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  19. Hervé Moulin & Alison Watts, 1996. "Two versions of the tragedy of the commons," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 399-421, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. McQuillin, Ben, 2008. "The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure," MPRA Paper 12049, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Branzei.R., & Ferrari, G. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S., 2001. "Two approaches to the problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects," Discussion Paper 22, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  22. Tijs, S. & Koster, M., 1996. "General aggregation of demand and cost sharing methods," Discussion Paper 87, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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