Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
AbstractIn this paper we analyze a simple non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff distribution for games in coalitional form. We show that under our bargaining regime a cooperative game is core-implementable and if it possesses the property of increasing returns to scale for cooperation. I.e., the game is convex. This offers a characterization of a purely cooperative notion by means of a non-cooperative foundation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (1994)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco
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- Moldovanu, Benny & Eyal Winter, 1993. "Core Implementation and Increasing Returns to Scale for Cooperation," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 289, University of Bonn, Germany.
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