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Coalition Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers

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  • Evans,R.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 9539.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:9539

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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

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Keywords: GAMES; COMPETITION;

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References

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  1. Moldovanu Benny & Winter Eyal, 1995. "Order Independent Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 21-34, April.
  2. Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  3. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January.
  4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  5. Lagunoff Roger D., 1994. "A Simple Noncooperative Core Story," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 54-61, July.
  6. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Huseyin Yildirim, 2010. "Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 41-57, January.
  2. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001. "Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
  3. Daniel Cardona & Arnold Polanski, 2013. "Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 217-240, July.
  4. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2007. "Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 167-196, September.
  5. Yves Breitmoser, 2011. "Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 149-169, June.
  6. Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September.
  7. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Okada, Akira, 2009. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core," Discussion Papers 2009-03, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  9. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2013. "Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1862-1890.
  10. Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2007. "Bargaining one-dimensional social choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 627-651, November.
  11. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2009. "A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 203-226, August.

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