Coalition Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 9539.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
Other versions of this item:
- Evans, Robert, 1997. "Coalitional Bargaining with Competition to Make Offers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 211-220, May.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
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"A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core,"
Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
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"Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core,"
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"Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003,"
Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
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- Brennan Platt, 2009. "Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 361-381, September.
- Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2007. "Bargaining one-dimensional social choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 627-651, November.
- Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2001.
"Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value,"
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Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 274-294, October.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, . "Bidding For The Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach To The Shapley Value," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 461.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Huseyin Yildirim, 2010. "Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 41-57, January.
- Yves Breitmoser, 2011. "Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 149-169, June.
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