This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Transparency, complementarity and holdout

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Roy Chowdhury, Prabal
Sengupta, Kunal

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper characterizes the conditions under which holdout (i.e. bargaining inefficiency) may, or may not be significant in a two-sided, one-buyer-many-seller model with complementarity. We address this problem in a very general setup with a bargaining protocol that is symmetric and allows for both publicly observable, as well as secret offers, and a technology that allows for variable degrees of complementarity. The central insight is that the transparency of the bargaining protocol, formalized by whether offers are publicly observable or secret, as well as the extent of complementarity, play a critical role in generating efficiency. Even with perfect complementarity, holdout seems to be largely resolved whenever the bargaining protocol is public (but not if it is secret). Further, irrespective of the bargaining protocol, holdout is resolved if the marginal contribution of the last seller is not too large.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17606/
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17606.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:17606

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: Multi-person bargaining; holdout; complementarity; efficiency; secret offers; public offers; Coase theorem; transparency.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Perry, M. & Rany, P., 1992. "A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9203, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  3. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gul, Faruk, 1989. "Bargaining Foundations of Shapley Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 81-95, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-80, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2002. "On the Role of Outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1477-1517, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1998. "Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 119-145, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hongbin Cai, 2003. "Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 583-606, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kyle Hyndman & Debraj Ray, 2007. "Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 74(4), pages 1125-1147, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Serrano Roberto, 1995. "A Market to Implement the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 285-294, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Flavio Menezes & Rohan Pitchford, 2004. "A model of seller holdout," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 231-253, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Delay in Multilateral Bargaining under Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 260-276, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Eckart, Wolfgang, 1985. "On the land assembly problem," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 364-378, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.