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Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities

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Author Info
László Á. Kóczy () (Budapest Tech)

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Abstract

The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some anomalies when related to classical concepts. We elaborate on these problems, define a modification of Bloch's model and show that its order-independent equilibria coincide with the (pessimistic) recursive core.

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File URL: http://www.bmf.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/wpaper/0801.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Author's Accepted Manuscript, 2008
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 0801.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Date of revision: Apr 2008
Publication status: Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior
Handle: RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0801

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Related research
Keywords: Core externalities sequential coalition formation order-independent equilibria

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Kóczy Lászlo Á., 2006. "Sequential Coalition Formation and the Core in the Presence of Externalities," Research Memoranda 047, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lagunoff Roger D., 1994. "A Simple Noncooperative Core Story," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 54-61, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Huang, Chen-Ying & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2006. "Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 771-793, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kóczy László Á., 2008. "Stationary quasi-perfect equilibrium partitions constitute the recursive core," Research Memoranda 028, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. László Á. Kóczy, 2006. "Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities," Working Paper Series 0801, Budapest Tech, Keleti Faculty of Economics, revised Apr 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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