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Recognition for sale

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  • Ali, S. Nageeb

Abstract

I examine the consequences of letting players compete for bargaining power in a multilateral bargaining game. In each period, the right to propose an offer is sold to the highest bidder, and all players pay their bids. If players vote according to any rule in which no player has veto power, then the first proposer captures the entire surplus. If a full consensus is needed for an offer to be accepted, then the first proposer shares the surplus with at most one other player, and as the period length between offers vanishes, one player may capture virtually the entire surplus. In settings with a stochastic or an endogenous surplus, players are unwilling to efficiently delay agreement or invest in the surplus.

Suggested Citation

  • Ali, S. Nageeb, 2015. "Recognition for sale," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 16-29.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:155:y:2015:i:c:p:16-29
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Sarah Auster & Nenad Kos & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Optimal Pricing, Private Information and Search for an Outside Offer," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 081, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    2. Sarah Auster & Nenad Kos & Salvatore Piccolo, 2021. "Optimal pricing, private information and search for an outside offer," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 758-777, December.
    3. Gomes, Armando, 2022. "Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 463-477.
    4. Marco Battaglini, 2021. "Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(11), pages 3206-3258.
    5. Burguet, Roberto & Caminal, Ramon, 2020. "Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    6. Andrzej Baranski & Ernesto Reuben, 2023. "Competing for Proposal Rights: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 20220085, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Mar 2023.
    7. Kos, Nenad & Auster, Sarah & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2019. "Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Endogenous Proposal Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 13542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Duk Gyoo Kim & Sang‐Hyun Kim, 2022. "Multilateral bargaining with proposer selection contest," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(1), pages 38-73, February.
    9. Johannes Münster & Markus Reisinger, 2021. "Sequencing Bilateral Negotiations with Externalities," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 096, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    10. Daniel Diermeier & Carlo Prato & Razvan Vlaicu, 2016. "A bargaining model of endogenous procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 985-1012, December.
    11. Yildirim, Mustafa, 2018. "Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly recognition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 102-105.
    12. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2019. "Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 389-399, May.
    13. Emin Karagözoğlu & Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2021. "Costly Preparations in Bargaining," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(2), pages 532-557, April.
    14. Kim, Duk Gyoo, 2019. "Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 161-175.
    15. Houba, Harold & Li, Duozhe & Wen, Quan, 2022. "Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Lobbying; All-pay auctions; Recognition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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