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Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition

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  • Yildirim, Mustafa

Abstract

I investigate team formation in a legislative bargaining model in which both the surplus and recognition are endogenous. I find that the optimal team size increases with stricter agreement rules and longer-sighted agents but remains too small from the social perspective. Moreover, the optimal size may not exhaust increasing returns to scale.

Suggested Citation

  • Yildirim, Mustafa, 2019. "Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 81-84.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:177:y:2019:i:c:p:81-84
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.02.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legislative bargaining; Voting rule; Rent-seeking; Team size;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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