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Cartel Quotas Under Majority Rule

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Author Info

  • Cave, J.
  • Salant, S.

Abstract

The authors examine the choice of quotas by legal volume-restricting organizations: cartels, commodity agreements, agricultural marketing boards, and prorationing boards. Unlike their illegal counterparts, legal cartels have published regulations and broader enforcement capabilities. However, differences in costs and size among cartel members still make quota selection contentious. Conflicts over quotas are typically resolved by voting. Side-payments to influence votes are prohibited. The authors examine the predicted effects of this real-world voting institution on prices and welfare. They also deduce the economic consequences of exogenous political changes, such as alterations in the voting weights or in the identity of the voters. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory in its series Papers with number 92-04.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:michet:92-04

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: cartels ; commodities;

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Cited by:
  1. Heintzelman, Martin & Salant, Stephen W. & Schott, Stephan, 2008. "Putting Free-Riding to Work: A Partnership Solution to the Common-Property Problem," MPRA Paper 9804, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Mesnard, Louis de, 2009. "Is the French mobile phone cartel really a cartel?," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2009-02, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
  3. Jaime Marquez, 1992. "Life expectancy of international cartels: an empirical analysis," International Finance Discussion Papers 439, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  4. César Martinelli & Rich Sicotte, 2004. "Voting in Cartels: Theory and Evidence from the Shipping Industry," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000598, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Pu-yan Nie, 2014. "Effects of capacity constraints on mixed duopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 112(3), pages 283-294, July.
  6. Nie, Pu-yan & Chen, You-hua, 2012. "Duopoly competitions with capacity constrained input," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 1715-1721.
  7. Volker Nocke & Peter EsoLucy White, 2007. "Competition for Scarce Resources," Economics Series Working Papers 365, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Janda, Karel, 2009. "Signaling the Strength of a Market Entrant," MPRA Paper 17007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Herbert Hovenkamp, 2011. "Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 3-18, August.

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