Coase, Competitions, and Compensation
AbstractI show that the Pigovian solution to a simple externalities problem and a particular Coasian solution can be viewed as competitive equilibria from different initial endowments. I also describe the ``compensation mechanism,'' a mechanism that implements either the Coasian or Pigovian solution as the outcome of an economically natural bargaining game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory in its series Papers with number 93-15.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.
economic theory ; competition;
Other versions of this item:
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
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