Private Storage of Common Property
AbstractThis paper examines a characteristic of common property problems unmodeled in the published literature: extracted common reserves are often stored privately rather than sold immediately. We examine the positive and normative effects of such storage, Privatization of common reserves through storage may eliminate inefficiency altogether but the premature extraction involved may also exacerbate them-even if rapid extraction does not reduce ultimate recovery.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory in its series Papers with number 97-08.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.
COLLECTIVE OWNERSHIP ; STORAGE ; NATURAL RESOURCES;
Other versions of this item:
- Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
- Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
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