Do Low-Price Guarantees Facilitate Collusion?
AbstractWe examine the role low-price guarantees allegedly play in supporting supracompetitive prices. We find that when firms can commit to matching or beating any lower price announced by a competitor, all Nash equilibria yield Bertrand selling prices. This result casts doubt on the robustness of the conclusions of models which restrict attention to meet-the-competition clauses only.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory in its series Papers with number 94-01.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY, ANN ARBOR MICHIGAN U.S.A.
pricing ; competition;
Other versions of this item:
- Hviid, Morton & Shaffer, Greg, 1994. "Do low-price Guarantees facilitate Collusion?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 422, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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- Enrique Fatas & Juan Mañez, 2007. "Are low-price promises collusion guarantees? An experimental test of price matching policies," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 59-77, March.
- Corts, Kenneth S., 1997. "On the competitive effects of price-matching policies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 283-299, May.
- Arbatskaya, Maria & Hviid, Morten & Shaffer, Greg, 2006. "On the use of low-price guarantees to discourage price cutting," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1139-1156, November.
- Enrique Fatás & Juan A. Mañez, 2004. "Are Low-Price Compromises Collusion Guarantees? An Experimental Test of Price Matching Policies," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/33, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
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