Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 22 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
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- JEL - Labor and Demographic Economics - - - - -
- Cla - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
- Num - Economic History - - - - -
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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- Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2008.
"Multi-person bargaining with complementarity: Is there holdout?,"
Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers
08-10, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2008. "Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?," MPRA Paper 11517, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2010.
"Market integration and strike activity,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 154-161, May.
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, . "Market integration and strike activity," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2201, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ana, MAULEON & Vincent, VANNETELBOSCH, 2005. "Market Integration and Strike Activity," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2005025, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2005. "Market integration and strike activity," CORE Discussion Papers 2005036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2009. "A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 203-226, August.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2009.
"Transparency, complementarity and holdout,"
17606, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent, 2013.
"Relative concerns and delays in bargaining with private information,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2013034, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2013. "Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 329-338, June.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2009. "Land Acquisition: Fragmentation, Political Intervention and Holdout," MPRA Paper 18951, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Delay in a bargaining game with contracts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(4), pages 339-353, December.
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