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Bargaining local compensation payments for the installation of new power transmission lines

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Joalland

    (UR ETBX - Environnement, territoires et infrastructures - IRSTEA - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture)

  • Jean-Christophe Pereau

    (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • T. Rambonilaza

    (UR ETBX - Environnement, territoires et infrastructures - IRSTEA - Institut national de recherche en sciences et technologies pour l'environnement et l'agriculture)

Abstract

This paper analyzes transmission system operator (TSO)-host community negotiations over an efficient and socially-optimal compensation payment for the installation of new electric power transmission lines. We consider that the TSO has an incentive to negotiate over a transfer that will become a function of final demand. We thus develop a bargaining game within a vertical relationship framework to include the distribution system operator (DSO) and the end-users at the downside of the bargaining problem. We determine the equilibrium of the game, for three negotiation protocols (sequential, bilateral, and multilateral) as an alternative to the non-cooperative situation. We show that when the number of municipalities involved in the process is higher than 5, the multilateral bargaining procedure is the most profitable for all agents, including the municipalities. Inversely, when the number of municipalities is lower than 5, different cases can arise. A single municipality will prefer the non-cooperative outcome while municipalities will prefer the sequential case when there are 2 or the bilateral case when there are 3 or 4. However, from the TSO standpoint and for the society, multilateral negotiations are always the best outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Joalland & Jean-Christophe Pereau & T. Rambonilaza, 2019. "Bargaining local compensation payments for the installation of new power transmission lines," Post-Print hal-02485122, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02485122
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.12.007
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02485122
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Compensation System; Compensations; Damages; Distribution System; Energy Planning; Installation; Local Acceptance; Nash Bargaining Solution; Negotiation Protocols; Transmission Planning; Electric Lines; Bargaining; Electric Power Transmission; Electrical Power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

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