This paper studies the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on wages and employment. When labor-management bargaining is industrywide, two effects of FDI are identified: the collusion effect and the threat-point effect. It is shown that: (1) FDI always reduces the negotiated wage and (2) FDI reduces union employment and the competitive wage if the union cares more about employment than wages or is equally concerned about employment and wages. However, if labor-management bargaining is firm-specific and unionization is industrywide, then the above effects of FDI are substantially reduced. Copyright 1998 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 50 (1998) Issue (Month): 2 (April) Pages: 284-301 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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